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Abstract 
The rural loan recovery problem in developing countries is frequently analyzed from 
the perspective of borrowers or financial institutions. But a frequently overlooked problem 
is that borrowers often are discouraged to repay and/ or institutions are not aggressive in 
loan recovery because governments intervene in rural financial markets to increase the 
prospects of getting re-elected. This political intervention may undermine the effectiveness 
of measures such as increasing real interest rates to improve loan allocation and recovery. 
A failure to address this political dimension in loan recovery analysis may lead to incorrect 
policy prescriptions. This paper provides an empirical analysis of how political interventions 
affect rural loan recovery in Bangladesh in the period 1980 to 1989. The results indicate 
that the negative effect of political intervention in loan allocation and recovery outweighs 
the effect of positive real interest rates. The government in Bangladesh intervenes in rural 
loan allocation and recovery formally through policies -interest exemptions, credit 
committees and interest rates - and informally through elected local government officials 
and local socio-political leaders. The intensity of informal intervention is expected to 
increase during an election period. Five variables - inflation rate, election years, interest 
exemption years, credit committee years and bank type - were included in the model used 
to explain loan recovery. The empirical results showed that elections, inflation rates, credit 
committees, and bank type affect rural loan recovery negatively, while interest exemptions 
affect it positively. 
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THE POLmCAL ECONOMY OF RURAL LOAN RECOVERY: 
EVIDENCE FROM BANGLADESH 
by 
M. A Baqui Khalily and Richard L. Meyer1 
Until recently, banks and governments in many less developed countries considered 
providing cheap credit to rural households under the supply leading strategy as an effective 
method to achieve comprehensive rural development (Patrick). This approach has been 
challenged by several economists (Adams; Fry; Gonzalez-Vega; McKinnon; Shaw; Von 
Pischke) who argue that it leads to the inefficient allocation of resources and to credit-
rationing because of excess loan demand and intervention in the lending decision-making 
process. The efficient allocation of funds has been at the front of this neo-liberal thesis. 
Interest rate reform has been the major policy prescription that has been proposed by 
reformers based on the argument that high interest rates would screen out the demand for 
credit for low rate of return projects. This approach has been accepted in several Asian 
countries including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines. The Bangladesh 
government has adjusted its interest rate structure several times in recent years. Rural 
lending rates were increased significantly from 7 percent in 1973 to 16 percent in 1989. But 
the rural loan recovery rate declined sharply from 52 percent in 1983 to 18 percent in 1989 
1 M.A Baqui Khalily is an Associate Professor in the Department of Finance and 
Banking, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh. Richard L. Meyer is a Professor in the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio State University, 
Columbus, Ohio, USA 
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despite the interest rate reform. Such low recovery rates not only affect the viability of rural 
credit institutions, but also affect credit turnover (Khalily; Meyer and Srinivasan). 
The problem of loan recovery in LDCs has been addressed by researchers from diff-
erent perspectives. Often times it has been attributed to the idea that (a) rural loans are 
risky, and {b) rural borrowers are too poor to repay (Donald}. Some analysts have argued 
that low recovery rates are due to lending policies, loan targeting, lender unwillingness to 
recover loans, and the management ability of bank employees (Braverman and Guash; 
Gregory et al., Maharajan et al., Von Pischke et al.). But a frequently overlooked problem 
is that borrowers are discouraged to repay and/ or lenders can not recover loans because of 
political intervention in rural financial markets {Blair; Kane). This paper presents an empi-
rical analysis of how political intervention affects rural loan recovery in Bangladesh, and 
shows how it undermines the effectiveness of positive real interest rates in stimulating loan 
recovery. Although politics are thought to affect loan recovery, no study has been found in 
the literature that reports an empirical test of the relationship. 
Three basic expectations about loan recovery in Bangladesh provide the framework 
used in this paper. First, honest borrowers may not be able to repay loans on time because 
of fluctuations in production and/ or unforeseen contingencies. However, a shortfall in 
income in one period may be offset by an increase in another period so honest borrowers 
are expected to eventually repay their loans. Second, delinquent borrowers that are under 
the political protection of their sponsors can avoid repaying loans. Third, government 
intervention in rural loan allocation and recovery, formally through financial policies and 
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informally through local government officials and political leaders, negatively affect loan 
recovery. 
THE RURAL BANKING SYSTEM AND TARGET LOAN RECOVERY 
The banking sector in Bangladesh prior to 1981 was largely dominated by public 
sector banks - six Nationalized Commercial Banks (NCBs) and two Development Banks. 
There were only a few foreign banks in the private sector. But the policy of privatization 
adopted by the government in 1981 led to the denationalization of two of the NCBs and the 
creation of 10 local private banks. Like the foreign banks, the local private banks do not 
have branches in rural areas because they consider rural lending too risky. Apart from the 
cooperative system, today the rural financial markets in Bangladesh essentially consist of the 
branches of four nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) and two government-owned 
agricultural development banks (BKB and RAKUB). Since the public sector banks are 
predominant, government intervention can occur in rural loan allocation and recovery and 
can undermine the effectiveness of financial policies, particularly interest rates. 
The rural banking system has undergone significant changes since 1977 because of 
the government's supply-leading financial strategy and the introduction of a "two-for-one" 
branching policy by the Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank). This branching policy required 
banks to open two rural branches for one urban branch so rural loans could be disbursed 
more effectively. As a result, the rural banking network expanded from 1,094 branches in 
1977 to 2,851in1981. This growth slowed, however, following suspension of the policy in 
1981. During the period 1976-91, the amount of total rural loans made increased by about 
4 
87 times, while the rural banking network increased by 8 times (Khalily, Meyer and 
Hushak). Rural bank managers make two types of loans: target and non-target. Target 
loans are government sponsored loans made under terms and conditions set by the 
Bangladesh Banlc, while non-target loans are made by banks using their own deposits. This 
paper analyzes the problem of recovering target loans. 
The loan recovery rate is defined as the percentage of target loans recovered relative 
to total recoverable target loans (principal plus interest). Table 1 reports the target loan 
recovery rate by bank type. Three major findings emerge from the table. First, the recovery 
rate shows a declining trend from 1980-81 to 1988-89. Second, the recovery rate improved 
marginally in 1983-84 relative to the previous year, and substantially in 1986-87 relative to 
1985-86. The government granted interest exemptions to borrowers in flood and cyclone 
affected areas in 1984, and to all borrowers in 1987. Interest exemptions are expected to 
stimulate recovery in the short run as borrowers take advantage of these special repayment 
conditions, but are expected to have a negative impact on long run recovery. Third, the 
recovery rate differs by the two bank types - commercial and development banks - probably 
because of the differences in management ability and banking technology. 
Generally, most target loan borrowers try to repay their loans. Honest borrowers 
may not be able to repay loans when due because of production fluctuations or unforeseen 
contingencies, but it is.expected that they will eventually repay. Meyer and Srinivasan, using 
data on short-term loans for the period 1979-84 for 89 rural bank branches, showed that 
about 70 percent of the principal amount of recoverable loans was recovered within five 
years after the due date. Borrowers under the political protection of their sponsors, 
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however, have a lower repayment rate (Khaled). Khaled showed that elected chairmen and 
members of rural local governments who are the most powerful in terms of rural power 
structure and influence did not repay any loans and no legal actions were taken against 
them. Not only did they not repay their own loans, they were instrumental in supporting 
their clients to also not repay their loans. Consequently, the overall loan recovery rate has 
been negatively affected by political intervention. 
RURAL POWER STRUCTURE, POLITICS AND RURAL FINANCE IN BANGLADESH 
Political intervention in the allocation of rural loans is quite common in developing 
countries. The government intervenes in the rural lending decision-making process as a tool 
for getting re-elected. One of the crucial factors in affecting elections is the perception of 
voters. There are at least two ways for a regime to influence voter perceptions: (a) through 
achieving economic growth with low inflation and unemployment (Frey and Schneider); and 
(b) through distributing economic and financial benefits directly to voters. In a developing 
country like Bangladesh where democratic institutions are weak and the government has 
been unstable, it is difficult for a government to influence voter decisions through the first 
approach. The latter approach appears to be more popular with the government as it tries 
to directly influence voter decisions. 
Since the majority of the voters live in rural areas, the government can try to 
influence their decisions by distributing financial benefits to them through rural financial 
markets in two ways: first, formally through rural financial and lending policies, and, 
secondly, informally through socio-political leaders. The role of socio-political leaders 
6 
depends on the rural social structure. When socio-political leaders play a dominate role in 
the rural society, the government may ensure their participation in local government and 
rural financial markets. 
In a faction based rural society as in Bangladesh, the traditional rural power structure 
is dominated by big farmers (Bertocci; Chowdhury; Islam; Wood; Zaidi). In each faction 
large landowners represent the patrons, while the other members of the faction are the 
clients. The nature of the relationship between patrons and clients and the degree of 
influence of the patrons dictates the pattern of linkage between national and rural politics 
through different types of economic and financial policies. Empirical studies have shown 
that large landowners and faction leaders dominate the local rural government units 
(Chowdhury; Rahman; Wood). Because of the influence of these large landowners and 
faction leaders who are patrons over the members of their factions, they are patronized by 
the government through their role in local government and their involvement in the 
distribution of relief goods in food for work programs and agricultural credit (Chowdhury; 
Tepper; Wood). 
Islam identified three types of brokers that link rural villages with urban areas in 
Bangladesh. First, there are a group of brokers who patronize their clients and voters. The 
local political leaders and local government officials belong to this group. The second group 
consists of educated people and traders acting as middlemen between government officials 
and rural people. The third group of brokers are urban agents of political parties who by 
their association with the bureaucrats and political leaders in power can promote public 
issues and initiate development programs for the rural people. A similar conclusion 
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regarding rural social and power structure was also found by Wood. Given this pattern of 
rural social and power structure and the relationship between rural and national politics, a 
government can maximize its political gains by patronizing the rural patrons through its 
programs and rural financial policies. 
FORMAL INTERVENTION THROUGH FINANCIAL POLICIES 
The Agricultural Credit Department (ACD) of the Bangladesh Bank designs target 
loan programs and sets the terms and conditions such as the eligibility of borrowers, 
maximum amount to be lent per loan, nature of loan supervision, and type of loan 
documentation that is required. The amount of target loans to be distributed by a bank is 
also set by the ACD. The target for each bank branch is set by its central office based on 
local economic characteristics and the operational size of the branch. As noted above, the 
distribution and recovery of target loans is constrained by financial policies which permit the 
government to formally intervene in the lending and recovery program of rural branches. 
The major policies that are likely to affect the rural loan recovery rate are interest rates, 
credit committees, and interest exemptions. 
Rural Lending Interest Rate Structure 
The nominal interest rate structure for rural loans has been changed five times during 
the period 1973-89 (Table 2). Interest rates on short term target loans were more than 
doubled from seven percent in 1973 to sixteen percent in 1989. The major changes were 
made during the 1980s and the present interest rate of 16 percent was introduced in 1983. 
Given a low and declining inflation rate since the early 1980s, the 1983 increase contributed 
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to a positive real interest rate. Real interest rates increased from one percent in 1983 to 
about 9 percent in 1989. Prior to 1983, however, the real interest rate was negative and was 
as high as a negative 70 percent. Although the real interest rate on rural target loans has 
increased significantly the past two decades, the loan recovery rate declined sharply from 
52 percent in 1983 to 18 percent in 1989. This inverse relationship appears to be 
inconsistent with the neo-liberal thesis about interest rates. The problem is that although 
interest rates increased, the political intervention in rural loan allocation and recovery 
continued to exist. Therefore, the effectiveness of high positive real interest rates in 
influencing a more efficient allocation and recovery of loans has been undermined by 
political intervention and other policy distortions. 
Credit Committees 
Credit Committees, created at the direction of the government in 1983, were intended 
to be involved in both the process of allocating and recovering target loans. These 
committees exist at the three tiers of local government - Union Council, Upazila and 
District. The credit committee at the union level, consisting of the chairman and members 
of the council, bank branch managers and block agricultural extension supervisors, is 
involved in rural lending by preparing lists of potential borrowers, by recommending loan 
amounts, and by assisting bank managers in recovering delinquent target loans. The 
committees at the upazila and district levels are essentially entrusted with the tasks of 
general supervision and follow up. 
The effectiveness of these committees in the allocation and recovery of target loans 
is questionable since the chairman and committee members are elected by the voters for 
.. 
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four-year terms. In addition, there is no defined criteria for use in preparing the list of 
potential borrowers. The re-election objective of elected local government officials is likely 
to enter into the preparation of these lists. They are likely to promote or sponsor their 
particular clients and expand their political base for re-election by including in the list the 
names of their clients and potential voters. The loan recovery authority assigned to the 
credit committee is likely to affect the loan recovery efforts of the branch managers. Until 
1987, the rural branch managers did not have any flexibility and authority in selecting 
borrowers, except to choose persons included in the list, and in recovering targeted rural 
loans. In 1987, the branch managers were finally given absolute authority and responsibility 
to select borrowers, and to disburse, monitor and recover targeted rural loans. 
Interest Exemption Programs 
Five interest exemption programs were implemented during the 1982-1991 period. 
The basic objectives were to ease the loan burden of the borrowers and to encourage them 
to repay overdue loans. The interest exemption programs announced in 1984 and 1985 pro-
vided for interest exemptions and loan rescheduling without any penalty interest for borro-
wers affected by natural calamities. The 1985 announcement exempted interest only for 
cyclone-affected borrowers. It did not, however, provide for loan rescheduling (Rashid). 
The 1986 and 1987 interest exemption programs aimed at improving the recovery rate and 
were applicable country-wide for all types of crop loans up to Taka 10,00<>2 (including prin-
cipal, interest, and service charges). The announcement in 1991 by the new democratically 
elected government as part of its election promise exceeded the earlier exemptions in terms 
2 In this period, 30 Taka were approximately equal to $1 US dollar. 
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of coverage. It provided for exemption of principal, interest and overdue interest penalties 
up to Taka 5,000. The earlier announcements generally did not provide for principal 
exemption. The 1991 announcement not only contributed to revenue loss but also to capital 
loss for the banks because the exempted principal means that the banks have to compensate 
depositors out of their capital and/or profits. The total cost of the 1991 announcement for 
the commercial and development banks has been estimated at 350 million Taka. 
There has been no significant study of the effects of the interest exemption programs 
on loan recovery rates. But the frequency of these programs has contributed to expectations 
about future interest exemptions and this is expected to contribute to the low and declining 
recovery rates. 
INFORMAL INTERVENTION THROUGH ELECTIONS 
In addition to its direct formal intervention in financial markets through policy-
making, the government can also informally intervene in the target loan allocation and 
recovery efforts of bank branch managers. A government is not likely to support a loan 
recovery drive and strict borrower selection procedures during an election period because 
of the negative impact it may have on some borrowers. During an election period, local 
government officials and elected representatives will likely intervene in target loan allocation 
and/or recovery efforts so that potential voters can more easily get loans and borrowers can 
avoid the pressure of bank officials to repay loans. This informal intervention by local 
political leaders and government officials may always exist but its intensity is likely to 
increase in election years. 
• 
11 
A LOAN RECOVERY MODEL 
f 
A simple recovery model was developed for this study to evaluate the impact of 
political interventions in rural target loan recovery based on the literature reviewed and the 
nature of the interventions discussed above. Following Frey and Schneider, the general 
framework of the model is specified as follows: 
MAX U(.) 
S.T. V(t) > V(t) * 
V(t) = f (POLIT, ECOPOL, RFMPOL, SOCIO) 
(1) 
(2) 
The basic objective of government is to maximize its utility function of getting re-elected 
subject to the constraints (1) and (2). Constraint (1) specifies that the government will have 
to get a minimum number of votes, V( t) •, to be re-elected. The second constraint indicates 
that the voting decision of voters is a function of political intervention (POLIT), macro-
economic developments (ECO POL), rural financial policies of the government (RFMPOL) 
and other socio-cultural (SOCIO) factors. 
Constraint (2) establishes the relationship between the political motives of the go-
vernment and the recovery behavior of rural bank branches which is shown in Figure 1. As 
diagramed, the basic objective of the government is to influence voter perceptions through 
local political leaders, rural financial markets, macro-economic variables and other socio-
cultural factors. A low recovery rate is assumed to positively influence voter perceptions 
towards the government. 
Four policy variables - interest rates, interest exemptions, credit committees and 
informal intervention in loan allocation and recovery - are identified as the ways the rural 
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financial markets influence voter decisions and the loan recovery rate. The equation 
explaining loan recovery behavior is specified as: 
Recovery=a.0 + u1ELEC + a..JNFL + «lNTEXEM + u4CRCOM + a.5BANK (3) 
where INTEXEM (interest exemptions) and CRCOM (credit committees) are dummy 
variables representing financial policy variables that are given the value of one in the years 
when interest exemptions and credit committees are in effect, and zero otherwise. The 
variables representing ELEC and BANK are dummy variables in which election years, and 
NCBs are given the value of one and zero otherwise. INFL (inflation) represents both 
macro-economic reforms and real interest rates. Since nominal interest rates are constant 
for all banks, the inflation rate influences real interest rates. It has been argued that as 
inflation reduces the real interest rate it may negatively affect recovery if borrowers develop 
expectations of high future inflation rates (Von Pischke et al.). The recovery equation is 
expressed in linear form and the estimation errors are assumed to be normally distributed. 
Formal government intervention through financial policies is captured, as discussed 
above, by variables representing credit committees and interest exemption programs. 
Interest exemption programs are expected to have two major effects: (a) they generate 
political support for the government in election years since they provide direct financial 
benefits to borrowers; and (b) they contribute to a higher recovery of loan principal in the 
short run, but in the long run they negatively affect it since borrowers may develop 
expectations about future exemptions. On the other hand, given the involvement of the 
elected local government officials in the credit committees and their authority for preparing 
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lists of potential borrowers and for recovering overdue loans, the sign of a 4 is expected to 
be negative. 
The ELEC variable is used in the model to capture the effects of informal political 
intervention by socio-political leaders in rural loan allocation and recovery. The sign of a 1 
is expected to be negative as these leaders are less likely to support any recovery drive by 
bank branch managers and/ or any stringent borrower selection procedure during an election 
year which may cost them votes. 
A BANK dummy variable is introduced in the model to capture the effects of 
organizational, managerial and environmental characteristics of the participating banks in 
rural lending. NCBs are expected to behave differently from the development banks since 
they are oriented towards making more commercially viable loans. The development banks, 
however, may be more effective in rural lending because of their specialization and longer 
experience in rural lending. The NCB branches have been making rural loans for the last 
10 years, while the development bank branches have over 30 years of rural lending ex-
perience. 
PARAMETER ESTIMATES AND ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The model parameters were estimated using an ordinary least squares regression 
model with pooled data for five banks for the 1980-89 period. The data were corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. The parameters of restricted and unrestricted 
models were estimated to test the validity and significance of the dummy variables, that is, 
to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients for BANK, ELEC and INTEXEM are equal 
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to zero. The Chow-test comparing the models rejected the null hypothesis. The parameter 
estimates reported in Table 3 have the expected signs and are significant. The model, 
significant at the 0.001 level, explains 94 percent of the variance in the loan recovery rate. 
The restricted model explains only 22 percent implying that the explanatory power of the 
intervention variables is much higher than the variable representing the real interest rate. 
The negative and significant coefficients for the ELEC and CRCOM variables 
support the hypothesis that political intervention in rural loan allocation and recovery affects 
the recovery rate. The parameter estimate for the election variable . implies that the 
recovery rate declines by about 25 percent points during an election year, while the 
significant negative coefficient for the CRCOM variable indicates that the credit committee 
variable contributed to a decline in the recovery rate by a little over 5 percent. 
The INTEXEM coefficient is significant and positive implying that the interest 
exemption policy contributed positively to the recovery rate. However, the marginal 
recovery rate with respect to interest exemption is only 4.80, i.e., interest exemption 
contributed to an increase of about five percent in the recovery rate. This suggests that the 
interest exemption policy has a limited positive impact on short run loan recovery. 
The coefficient for the inflation variable is negative and significant implying that a 
reduction in the real interest rate decreases the target loan recovery rate because future 
expectations of a high inflation rate reduce the time value of money. The size of the 
coefficient for the inflation variable and its level of significance in the unrestricted model 
changed considerably from the restricted model. In the restricted model, the coefficient for 
the inflation variable was -1.33 (significant at the 5 percent level), while it was -0.29 
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(insignificant at the 5 percent level, but significant at the 15 percent level) in the 
unrestricted model. In addition, the coefficient for the inflation rate variable compared with 
the intervention variable coefficients in terms of size and significance suggests relatively less 
importance for the former in loan recovery. This indicates that political intervention 
outweighs the effect of the inflation rate in loan recovery. 
The difference in loan recovery between commercial and development banks is 
captured by the negative and significant BANK dummy variable. The negative coefficient 
of 17.17 implies that the recovery rate for the NCBs is lower than the development banks 
by 17 percentage points. Several factors may contribute to this difference: (a) development 
banks are specialized in making rural loans and may have developed a more appropriate 
technology for making and recovering rural loans because they have been operating in rural 
areas for over three decades; and (b) the commercial bank employees may not be as well 
trained in making target loans because commercial banks have been more oriented towards 
mobilizing deposits and making less risky non-target loans. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this paper was to conduct an empirical test of the relationship 
between government intervention in rural loan allocation and recovery and the recovery rate 
of targeted rural loan in Bangladesh over the period 1980-1989. During this period, the 
recovery rate fell from over 50 percent to less than 20 percent. A regression model was 
developed in which the recovery rate is explained by five variables. Two financial policy 
variables were introduced to represent the years that interest exemptions and credit 
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committees were in effect. Two variables represented election years and the effects of 
nationalized commercial banks versus development banks. The fifth variable captured the 
differences in inflation rate over the period. 
The empirical results of the model are consistent with our expectations of how 
political intervention affects target loan recovery in Bangladesh. Four important findings 
emerged from the analysis. First, interest exemption programs positively influence the 
recovery rate at least in the short run, while informal intervention proxied by the election 
variable and formal intervention represented by the credit committee variable negatively 
affect the recovery rate. Second, the inflation rate discourages borrowers from repaying 
loans because it reduces the real interest rate and creates future expectations of high 
inflation. Therefore, high real interest rates can be expected to increase recovery rates. 
Third, commercial banks have a lower loan recovery rate than development banks. This 
may be attributed to different loan portfolios, management ability, technology and the size 
of bank branches. Fourth, the effect of the intervention variables outweighs the effect of 
the inflation rate on loan recovery rates. The effectiveness of high real interest rates on the 
rural loan recovery rate appears to be undermined by the interventions associated with the 
political objective of getting re-elected. Privatizing the banks or giving public sector banks 
greater flexibility in setting interest rates, selecting borrowers and recovering delinquent 
loans could reduce the possibility of government interventions in rural financial markets. 
Variable interest rates, although introduced in Bangladesh in 1990, are not applicable in 
target rural lending. Furthermore, increasing interest rates may not be an effective method 
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to stimiulate loan recovery if governments distort rural financial markets with political 
interventions. 
Low loan recovery can be explained from different perspectives - economic, institu-
tional and political economy. There is no denying that poor recovery rates in some cases 
are due to financial problems faced by borrowers. But, in addition, borrowers often do not 
repay loans and lenders can not energetically recover loans because of government interven-
tions designed to increase the probability of winning elections. A failure to address this 
dimension in loan recovery analysis may lead to incorrect policies prescriptions. There is 
a growing evidence that for a given bank the recovery rate for government sponsored loans 
is lower than for loans made out of a bank's own resources (Aguilera). Improving the 
viability of rural banks in a developing country like Bangladesh requires the reduction or 
elimination of government intervention in loan allocation and recovery so that banks are 
free to make good loans and recover them. In addition, the reduction in these interventions 
will probably increase the effectiveness of financial policies, particularly interest rates, in 
improving rural loan allocation and recovery. 
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Year 
1980-81 
1981-82 
1982-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
• 
Source: 
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Table 1 
Rural Target Loan Recovery Rate•, 1980-89 
Year Ending June 30 
Nationalized 
Commercial Banks 
(percent) 
36.3 
31.3 
30.0 
32.4 
30.0 
20.7 
42.0 
17.3 
13.7 
Agricultural 
Development 
Banlcs 
67.8 
67.9 
49.6 
49.9 
44.2 
30.6 
41.4 
27.2 
21.8 
All Banks 
51.6 
50.6 
42.1 
42.8 
42.3 
26.5 
42.3 
24.3 
18.8 
Recovery rate is defined as percent of target loans recovered relative to 
total recoverable target loans including principal and interest. 
Unpublished Data, Agricultural Credit Department, Bangladesh Bank. 
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Table 2 
Lending Rate Structure of Scheduled Banks, 1973-89 
Effective Major Loan Type Inflation 
Period 
Normal Agricultural Industry Rate 
Target Loan 
1973-74 9.0-10.0 7.0 7.0-8.0 14.0 
1974-75 12.0-13.0 11.0 12.0-13.0 702 
1975-76 12.0-13.0 11.0 12.0-13.0 -23.8 
1976-77 12.0-13.0 10.5 12.0-13.0 -3.3 
1977-78 11.0-12.0 10.5 11.5-13.0 30.5 
1978-79 11.0-12.0 10.5 11.5-13.0 13.0 
1979-80 11.0-12.0 10.5 11.5-13.0 13.0 
1980-81 15.5-16.0 12.0 14.0-14.5 10.5 
1981-82 15.5-16.0 12.0 14.0-14.5 12.6 
1982-83 15.5-16.0 12.0 14.0-14.5 4.9 
1983-84 15.5-16.0 12.0 14.0-14.5 16.7 
1984-85 16.0 16.0 14.5 14.7 
1985-86 16.0 16.0 14.5 10.0 
1986-87 16.0 16.0 14.5 10.9 
1987-88 16.0 16.0 14.5 7.4 
1988-89 16.0 16.0 14.5 7.6 
Source: Economic Trends, August, 1991, Bangladesh Bank. 
RE-El.£CTION 
OF 
GOVERNMENT 
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Figure 1 Relationship between the Political Objective of Re-election and Intervention 
in Rural Financial Markets 
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Table 3 
Estimated Parameters of the Target Loan Recovery Function 
Unrestricted Model Restricted Model 
Variable Coefficient t-ratio Coefficient t-ratio 
Constant 57.60 5.31* 19.36 3.38* 
Inflation - 0.29 -1.18*** -133 -2.63* 
(INFL) 
Interest 4.80 7.19* 
Exemption 
(INTEXEM) 
Election -24.51 -6.53* 
(ELEC) 
Credit -5.21 -1.58* 
Committees 
(CRCOM) 
Bank -17.17 -2.32* 
R-square 0.94 0.22 
* Significant at 5 percent level. 
** Significant at 10 percent level. 
*** Significant at 15 percent level. 
' . 
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1. Introduction 
Until recently, banks and governments in many less developed countries considered 
providing cheap credit to rural households under the supply leading strategy as an ef-
fective method to achieve comprehensive rural development (Patrick). This approach 
has been challenged by several economists (Adams; Fry; Gonzalez-Vega; McKinnon; 
Shaw; Von Pischke) who argue that it leads to the inefficient allocation of resources 
and to credit-rationing because of excess loan demand and intervention in the lending 
decision-making process. The efficient allocation of funds has been at the front of this 
neo-liberal thesis. Interest rate reform has been the major policy prescription that has 
been proposed by reformers based on the argument that high interest rates would screen 
out the demand for credit for low rate of return projects. This approach has been ac-
cepted in several Asian countries including Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal and the Philip-
pines. The Bangladesh government has adjusted its interest rate structure several times 
in recent years. Rural lending rates were increased significantly from 7 percent in 1973 
to 16 percent in 1989. But the rural loan recovery rate declined sharply from 52 percent 
in 1983 to 18 percent in 1989 despite the interest rate reform. Such low recovery rates 
not only affect the viability of rural credit institutions, but also affect credit turnover (Khalily; 
Meyer and Srinivasan). 
The problem of loan recovery in LDCs has been addressed by researchers from differ-
ent perspectives. Often times it has been attributed to the idea that (a) rural loans are 
risky, and (b) rural borrowers are too poor to repay (Donald). Some analysts have ar-
gued that low recovery rates are due to lending policies, loan targeting, lender unwill-
ingness to recover loans, and the management ability of bank employees (Braverman 
and Guash; Gregory et al., Maharajan et al., Von Pischke et al.). But a frequently over-
looked problem is that borrowers are discouraged to repay and/or lenders can not recover 
loans because of political intervention in rural financial markets (Blair; Kane). This paper 
presents an empirical analysis of how political intervention affects rural loan recovery 
in Bangladesh, and shows how it undermines the effectiveness of positive real interest 
rates in stimulating loan recovery. Although politics are thought to affect loan recovery, 
no study has been found in the literature that reports an empirical test of the relation-
ship. 
Three basic expectations about loan recovery in Bangladesh provide the framework 
used in this paper. First, honest borrowers may not be able to repay loans on time be-
cause of fluctuations in production and/or unforeseen contingencies. However, a short-
23 
SAVINGS AND DEVELOPMENT - No. 1 - 1993 - XVII 
fall in income in one period may be offset by an increase in another period so honest 
borrowers are expected to eventually repay their loans. Second, delinquent borrowers· 
that are under the political protection of their sponsors can avoid repaying loans. Third, 
government intervention in rural loan allocation and recovery, formally through finan-
cial policies and informally through local government officials and political leaders, 
negatively atfect loan recovery. 
2. The Rural Banking System and Target Loan Recovery 
The banking sector in Bangladesh prior to 1981 was largely dominated by public sec-
tor banks - six Nationalized Commercial Banks (NCBs) and two Development Banks. 
There were only a few foreign banks in the private sector. But the policy of privatization 
adopted by the government in 1981 led to the denationalization of two of the NCBs and 
the creation of 10 local private banks. Like the foreign banks, the local private banks 
do not have branches in rural areas because they consider rural lending too risky. Apart 
from the cooperative system, today the rural financial markets in Bangladesh essen-
tially consist of the branches of four nationalized commercial banks (NCBs) and two 
government-owned agricultural development banks (BKB and RAKUB). Since the public 
sector banks are predominant, government intervention can occur in rural loan alloca~ 
tion and recovery and can undermine the effectiveness of financial policies, particular-
ly interest rates. 
The rural banking system has undergone significant changes since 1977 because of 
the government's supply-leading financial strategy and the introduction of a "two-for-
one" branching policy by the Bangladesh Bank (Central Bank). This branching policy 
required banks to open two rural branches for one urban branch so rural loans could 
be disbursed more effectively. As a result, the rural banking network expanded from 
1,094 branches in 1977 to 2,851 in 1981. This growth slowed, however, following suspen-
sion of the policy in 1981, During the period 1976-91, the amount of total loans made 
increased by about 87 times, while the rural banking network increased by 8 times (Khali-
ly, Meyer and Hushak). Rural bank managers make two types of loans: target and non-
target. Target loans are government sponsored loans made under terms and condi-
tions set by the Bangladesh Bank, while non-target loans are made by banks using their 
own deposits. This paper analyzes the problem of recovering target loans. 
The loan recovery rate is defined as the percentage of target loans recovered relative 
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to total recoverable target loans (principal plus interest). Table 1 reports the target loan 
recovery rate by bank type. Three major findings emerge from the table. First, the 
recovery rate shows a declining trend from 1980-81 to 1988-89. Second, the recovery 
rate improved marginally in 1983-84 relative to the previous year, and substantially in 
1986-87 relative to 1985-86. The government granted interest exemptions to borrowers 
in flood and cyclone affected areas in 1984, and to all borrowers in 1987. Interest ex-
emptions are expected to stimulate recovery in the short run as borrowers take advan-
tage of these special repayment conditions, but are expected to have a negative im-
pact on long run recovery. Third, the recovery rate differs by the two bank types -
commercial and development banks - probably because of the differences in manage-
ment ability and banking technology. 
Table 1 
RURAL TARGET LOAN RECOVERY RATE', 1980-89 - Year Ending June 30 
Agricultural 
Nationalized Development 
Year Commercial Banks Banks All Banks 
(percent) 
1980-81 36.3 67.8 51.6 
1981-82 31.3 67.9 50.6 
1982-83 30.0 49.6 42.1 
1983-84 32.4 49.9 42.8 
1984-85 30.0 44.2 42.3 
1985-86 20.7 30.6 26.5 
1986-87 42.0 41.4 42.3 
1987-88 17.3 27.2 24.3 
1988-89 13.7 21.8 18.8 
•Recovery rate is defined as percent of target loans recovered relative to total recoverable target loans including principal and 
interest. 
Source: Unpublished Data, Agricultural Credit Department, Bangladesh Bank. 
Generally, most target loan borrowers try to repay their loans. Honest borrowers may 
not be able to repay loans when due because of production fluctuations or unforeseen 
contingencies, but it is expected that they will eventually repay. Meyer and Srinivasan, 
using data on short-term loans for the period 1979-84 for 89 rural bank branches, showed 
that about 70 percent of the principal amount of recoverable loans was recovered within 
five years after the due date. Borrowers under the political protection of their sponsors, 
however, have a lower repayment rate (Khaled). Khaled showed that elected chairmen 
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and members of rural local governments who are the most powerful in terms of rural 
power structure and influence did not repay any loans and no legal actions were taken 
against them. Not only did they not repay their own loans, they were instrumental in 
supporting their clients to also not repay their loans. Consequently, the overall loan 
recovery rate has been negatively affected by political intervention. 
3. Rural Power Structure, Politics and Rural Finance in Bangladesh 
Political intervention in the allocation of rural loans is quite common in developing coun-
tries. The government intervenes in the rural lending decision-making process as a tool 
for getting re-elected. One of the crucial factors in affecting elections is the perception 
of voters. There are at least two ways for a regime to influence voter perceptions: (a) 
through achieving economic growth with low inflation and unemployment (Frey and 
Schneider); and (b) through distributing economic and financial benefits directly to voters. 
In a developing country like Bangladesh where democratic institutions are weak and 
the government has been unstable, it is difficult for a government to influence voter 
decisions through the first approach. The latter approach appears to be more popular 
with the government as it tries to directly influence voter decisions. 
Since the majority of the voters live in rural areas, the government can try to influence 
their decisions by distributing financial benefits to them through rural financial markets 
in two ways: first, formally through rural financial and lending policies, and, secondly, 
informally through socio-political leaders. The role of socio-political leaders depends 
on the rural social structure. When socio-political leaders play a dominate role in the 
rural society, the government may ensure their participation in local government and 
rural financial markets. 
In a faction based rural society as in Bangladesh, the traditional rural power structure 
is dominated by big farmers (Bertocci; Chowdhury; Islam; Wood; Zaidi). In each faction 
large landowners represent the patrons, while the other members of the faction are the 
clients. The nature of the relationship between patrons and clients and the degree of 
influence of the patrons dictates the pattern of linkage between national and rural politics 
through different types of economic and financial policies. Empirical studies have shown 
that large landowners and faction leaders dominate the local rural government units 
(Chowdhury; Rahman; Wood). Because of the influence of these large landowners and 
faction leaders who are patrons over the members of their factions, they are patronized 
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by the government through their role in local government and their involvement in the distribution 
of relief goods in food for work programs and agricultural credit (Chowdhury; Tepper; Wood). 
Islam identified three types of brokers that link rural villages with urban areas in 
Bangladesh. First, there are a group of brokers who patronize their clients and voters. 
The local political leaders and local government officials belong to this group. The se-
cond group consists of educated people and traders acting as middlemen between 
government officials and rural people. The third group of brokers are urban agents of 
political parties who by their association with the bureaucrats and political leaders in 
power can promote public issues and initiate development programs for the rural peo-
ple. A similar conclusion regarding rural social and power structure was also found by 
Wood. Given this pattern of rural social and power structure and the relationship bet-
ween rural and national politics, a government can maximize its political gains by 
patronizing the rural patrons through its programs and rural financial policies. 
4. Formal Intervention through Financial Policies 
The Agricultural Credit Department (ACD) of the Bangladesh Bank designs target loan 
programs and sets the terms and conditions such as the eligibility of borrowers, max-
imum amount to be lent per loan, nature of loan supervision, and type of loan documen-
tation that is required. The amount of target loans to be distributed by a bank is also 
set by the ACD. The target for each bank branch is set by its central office based on 
local economic characteristics and the operational size of the branch. As noted above, 
the distribution and recovery of target loans is constrained by financial policies which 
permit the government to formally intervene in the lending and recovery program of 
rural branches. The major policies that are likely to affect the rural loan recovery rate 
are interest rates, credit committees, and interest exemptions. 
4.1. Rural Lending Interest Rate Structure 
The nominal interest rate structure for rural loans has been changed five times during 
the period 1973-89 (Table 2). Interest rates on short term target loans were more than 
doubled from seven percent in 1973 to sixteen percent in 1989. The major changes 
were made during the 1980s and the present interest rate of 16 percent was introduc-
ed in 1983. Given a low and declining inflation rate since the early 1980s, the 1983 
increase contributed to a positive real interest rate. Real interest rates increased from 
27 
SAVINGS AND DEVELOPMENT - No. 1 - 1993 - XVII 
one percent in 1983 to about 9 percent in 1989. Prior to 1983, however, the real in-
terest rate was negative and was as high as a negative 70 percent. Although the real 
interest rate on rural target loans has increased significantly the past two decades, the 
loan recovery rate declined sharply from 52 percent in 1983 to 18 percent in 1989. This 
inverse relationship appears to be inconsistent with the nee-liberal thesis about interest 
rates. The problem is that although interest rates increased, the political intervention 
in rural loan allocation and recovery continued to exist. Therefore, the effectiveness 
of high positive real interest rates in influencing a more efficient allocation and recovery 
of loans has been undermined by political intervention and other policy distortions. 
Table 2 
LENDING RATE STRUCTURE OF SCHEDULED BANKS, 1973-89 
Effective Major Loan Type 
Period 
Normal Agricultural Industry 
Target Loan 
1973-74 9.0-10.0 7.0 7.0- 8.0 
1974-75 12.0-13.0 11.0 12.0-13.0 
1975-76 12.0-13.0 11.0 12.0-13.0 
1976-77 12.0-13.0 10.5 12.0-13.0 
1977-78 11.0-12.0 10.5 11.5-13.0 
1978-79 11.0-12.0 10.5 11.5-13.0 
1979-80 11.0-12.0 10.5 11.5-13.0 
1980-81 15.5-16.0 12.0 14.0-14.5 
1981-82 15.5-16.0 12.0 14.0-14.5 
1982-83 15.5-16.0 12.0 14.0-14.5 
1983-84 15.5-16.0 12.0 14.0-14.5 
1984-85 16.0 16.0 14.5 
1985-86 16.0 16.0 14.5 
1986-87 16.0 16.0 14.5 
1987-88 16.0 16.0 14.5 
1988-89 16.0 16.0 14.5 
Source: Economic Trends, August, 1991, Bangladesh Bank. 
4.2. Credit Committees 
Inflation 
Rate 
14.0 
70.2 
-23.8 
-3.3 
30.5 
13.0 
13.0 
10.5 
12.6 
4.9 
16.7 
14.7 
10.0 
10.9 
7.4 
7.6 
Credit Committees, created at the direction of the government in 1983, were intended 
to be involved in both the process of allocating and recovering target loans. These com-
mittees exist at the three tiers of local government- Union Council, Upazila and District. 
The credit committee at the union level, consisting of the chairman and members of 
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the council, bank branch managers and block agricultural extension supervisors, is in-
volved in rural lending by preparing lists of potential borrowers, by recommending loan 
amounts, and by assisting bank managers in recovering delinquent target loans. The 
committees at the upazila and district levels are essentially entrusted with the tasks 
of general supervision and follow up. 
The effectiveness of these committees in the allocation and recovery of target loans 
is questionable since the chairman and committee members are elected by the voters 
for four-year terms. In addition, there is no defined criteria for use in preparing the list 
of potential borrowers. The re-election objective of elected local government officials 
is likely to enter into the preparation of these lists. They are likely to promote or spon-
sor their particular clients and expand their political base for re-election by including 
in the list the names of their clients and potential voters. The loan recovery authority 
assigned to the credit committee is likely to affect the loan recovery efforts of the branch 
managers. Until 1987, the rural branch managers did not have any flexibility and authority 
in selecting borrowers, except to choose persons included in the list, and in recovering 
targeted rural loans. In 1987, the branch managers were finally given absolute authori-
ty and responsibility to select borrowers, and to disburse, monitor and recover targeted 
rural loans. 
4.3. Interest Exemption Programs 
Five interest exemption programs were implemented during the 1982-1991 period. The 
basic objectives'were to ease the loan burden of the borrowers and to encourage them 
to repay overdue loans. The interest exemption programs announced in 1984 and 1985 
provided for interest exemptions and loan rescheduling without any penalty interest for 
borrowers affected by natural calamities. The 1985 announcement exempted interest 
only for cyclone-affected borrowers. It did not, however, provide for loan rescheduling 
(Rashid). The 1986 and 1987 interest exemption programs aimed at improving the 
recovery rate and were applicable country-wide for all types of crop loans up to Taka 
10,0001 (including principal, interest, and service charges). The announcement in 1991 
by the new democratically elected government as part of its election promise exceed-
ed the earlier exemptions in terms of coverage. It provided for exemption of principal, 
interest'and overdue interest penalties up to Taka 5,000. The earlier announcements 
1 In this period, 30 Taka were approximately equal to $1 US dollar. 
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generally did not provide for principal exemption. The 1991 announcement not only con-
tributed to revenue loss but also to capital loss for the banks because the exempted 
principal means th_at the banks have to compensate depositors out of their capital and/or 
profits. The total cost of the 1991 announcement for the commercial and development 
banks has been estimated at 350 million Taka. 
There has been no significant study of the effects of the interest exemption programs 
on loan recovery rates. But the frequency of these programs has contributed to expec-
tations about future interest exemptions and this is expected to contribute to the low 
and declining recovery rates. 
5. Informal Intervention through Elections 
In addition to its direct formal intervention in financial markets through policy-making, 
the government can also informally intervene in the target loan allocation and recovery 
efforts of bank branch managers. A government is not likely to support a loan recovery 
drive and strict borrower selection procedures during an election period because of the 
negative impact it may have on some borrowers. During an election period, local govern-
ment officials and elected representatives will likely intervene in target loan allocation 
and/or recovery efforts so that potential voters can more easily get loans and borrowers 
can avoid the pressure of bank officials to repay loans. This informal intervention by 
local political leaders and government officials may always exist but its intensity is like-
ly to increase in election years. 
6. A Loan Recovery Model 
A simple recovery model was developed for this study to evaluate the impact of political 
interventions in rural target loan recovery based on the literature reviewed and the nature 
of the interventions discussed above. Following Frey and Schneider, the general 
framework of the model is specified as follows: 
30 
MAX U (.) 
S.T. V (t) > V (t)* 
V (t) f (POLIT, ECOPOL, RFMPOL, SOCIO) 
(1) 
(2) 
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The basic objective of government is to maximize its utiliy function of getting re-elected 
subject to the constraints (1) and (2). Constraint (1) specifies that the government will 
have to get a minimum number of votes, V(t)*, to be re-elected. The second constraint 
indicates that the voting decision of voters is a function of political intervention (POLIT), 
macro-economic developments (ECOPOL), rural financial policies of the government 
(RFMPOL) and other socio-cultural (SOCIO) factors. 
Constraint (2) establishes the relationship between the political motives of the govern-
ment and the recovery behavior of rural bank branches which is shown in Figure 1. 
As diagramed, the basic objective of the government is to influence voter perceptions 
through local political leaders, rural financial markets, macro-economic variables and 
other socio-cultural factors. A low recovery rate is assumed to positively influence voter 
perceptions towards the government. 
Four policy variables - interest rates, interest exemptions, credit committees and in-
formal intervention in loan allocation and recovery - are identified as the ways the rural 
financial markets influence voter decisions and the loan recovery rate. The equation 
explaining loan recovery behavior is specified as: 
Recovery = a0 + a 1 ELEC + a 2 INFL + a 3 INTEXEM + a 4 CRCOM + a5 BANK (3) 
where INTEXEM (interest exemptions) and CRCOM (credit committees) are dummy 
variables representing financial policy variables that are given the value of one in the 
years when interest exemptions and credit committees are in effect, and zero other-
wise. The variables representing ELEC and BANK are dummy variables in which elec-
tion years, and NCBs are given the value of one and zero otherwise. INFL (inflation) 
represents both macro-economic reforms and real interest rates. Since nominal interest 
rates are constant for all banks, the inflation rate influences real interest rates. It has 
been argued· that as inflation reduces the real interest rate in may negatively affect 
recovery if borrowers develop expectations of high future inflation rates (Von Pischke 
et al.). The recovery equation is expressed in linear form and the estimation errors are 
assumed to be normally distributed. 
Formal government intervention through financial policies is captured, as discussed 
above, by variables representing credit committees and interest exemption programs. 
Interest exemption programs are expected to have two major effects: (a) they generate 
political support for the government in election years since they provide direct financial 
benefits to borrowers; and (b) they contribute to a higher recovery of loan principal in 
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the short run, but in the long run they negatively affect it since borrowers may develop 
expectations about future exemptions. On the other hand, given the involvement of the 
elected local government officials in the credit committees and their authority for prepar-
ing lists of potential borrowers and for recovering overdue loans, the sign of a 4 is ex-
pected to be negative. 
The ELEC variable is used in the model to capture the effects of informal political in-
tervention by socio-political leaders in rural loan allocation and recovery. The sign of 
a 1 is expected to be negative as these leaders are less likely to support any recovery 
drive by bank branch managers and/or any stringent borrower selection procedure during 
an election year which may cost them votes. 
A BANK dummy variable is introduced in the model to capture the effects of organizational, 
managerial and environmental characteristics of the participating banks in rural lending. 
NCBs are expected to behave differently from the development banks since they are oriented 
towards making more commercially viable loans. The development banks, however, may 
be more effective in rural lending because of their specialization and longer experience 
in rural lending. The NCB branches have been making rural loans for the last 1 O years, 
while the development bank branches have over 30 years of rural lending experience. 
7. Parameter Estimates and Analysis of Results 
The model parameters were estimated using an ordinary least squares regression model 
with pooled data for five banks for the 1980-89 period. The data were corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation. The parameters of restricted and unrestricted 
models were estimated to test the validity and significance of the dummy variables, that 
is, to test the null hypothesis that the coefficients for BANK, ELEC and INTEXEM are 
equal to zero. The Chow-test comparing the models rejected the null hypothesis. The 
parameter estimates reported in Table 3 have the expected signs and are significant. 
The model, significant at the 0.001 level, explains 94 percent of the variance in the loan 
recovery rate. The restricted model explains only 22 percent implying that the explanatory 
power of the intervention variables is much higher than the variable representing the 
real interest rate. 
The negative and significant coefficients for the ELEC and CRCOM variables support 
the hypothesis that political intervention in rural loan allocation and recovery affects 
the recovery rate. The parameter estimate for the election variable implies that the 
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recovery rate declines by about 25 percent points during an election year, while the 
significant negative coefficient for the CRCOM variable indicates that the credit com-
mittee variable contributed to a decline in the recovery rate by a little over 5 percent. 
Table 3 
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS OF THE TARGET LOAN RECOVERY FUNCTION 
Unrestricted Model 
Variable 
Constant 
Inflation 
(INFL) 
Interest 
Exemption 
(INTEXEM) 
Election 
(ELEC) 
Credit 
Committees 
(CRCOM) 
Bank 
A-square 
Coefficient 
57.60 
-0.29 
4.80 
-24.51 
-5.21 
-17.17 
0.94 
• Significant at 5 percent level. 
• • Significant at 1 O percent level. 
• • • Significant at 15 percent level. 
t-ratio 
5.31" 
-1.18" .. 
7.19" 
-6.53" 
-1.58" 
-2.32" 
Restricted Model 
Coefficient 
19.36 
-1.33 
0.22 
t-ratio 
3.38" 
-2.63" 
The INTEXEM coefficient is significant and positive implying that the interest exemp-
tion policy contributed positively to the recovery rate. However, the marginal recovery 
rate with respect to interest exemption is only 4.80, i.e., interest exemption contributed 
to an increase of about five percent in the recovery rate. This suggests that the interest 
exemption policy has a limited positive impact on short run loan recovery. 
The coefficient for the inflation variable is negative and significant implying that a reduc-
tion in the real interest rate decreases the target loan recovery rate because future ex-
pectations of a high inflation rate reduce the time value of money. The size of the coef-
ficient fo the inflation variable and its level of significance in the unrestricted model chang-
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ed considerably from the restricted model. In the restricted model, the coefficient for 
the inflation variable was -1.33 (significant at the 5 percent level), while it was -0.29 
(insignificant at the 5 percent level, but significant at the 15 percent level) in the 
unrestricted model. In addition, the coefficient for the inflation rate variable compared 
with the intervention variable coefficients in terms of size and significance suggests 
relatively less importance for the former in loan recovery. This indicates that political 
intervention outweighs the effect of the inflation rate in loan recovery. 
The difference in loan recovery between commercial and development banks is cap-
tured by the negative and significant BANK dummy variable. The negative coefficient 
of 17.17 implies that the recovery rate for the NCBs is lower than the development banks 
by 17 percentage points. Several factors may contribute to this difference: (a) develop-
ment banks are specialized in making rural loans and may have developed a more ap-
propriate technology for making and recovering rural loans because they have been 
operating in rural areas for over three decades; and (b) the commercial bank employees 
may not be as well trained in making target loans because commercial banks have been 
more oriented towards mobilizing deposits and making less risky non-target loans. 
8. Summary and Conclusions 
The objective of this paper was to conduct an empirical test of the relationship between 
government intervention in rural loan allocation and recovery and the recovery rate of 
targeted rural loan in Bangladesh over the period 1980-1989. During this period, the 
recovery rate fell from over 50 percent to less than 20 percent. A regression model was 
developed in which the recovery rate is explained by five variables. Two financial policy 
variables were introduced to represent the years that interest exemptions and credit 
committees were in effect. Two variables represented election years and the effects 
of nationalized commercial banks versus development banks. The fifth variable cap-
tured the differences in inflation rate over the period. 
The empirical results of the model are consistent with our expectations of how political 
intervention affects target loan recovery in Bangladesh. Four important findings emerged 
from the analysis. First, interest exemption programs positively influence the recovery 
rate at least in the short run, while informal intervention proxied by the election variable 
and formal intervention represented by the credit committee variable negatively affect 
the recovery rate. Second, the inflation rate discourages borrowers from repaying loans 
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because it reduces the real interest rate and creates future expectations of high infla-
tion. Therefore, high real interest rates can be expected to increase recovery rates. Third, 
commercial banks have a lower loan recovery rate than development banks. This may 
be attributed to different loan portfolios, management ability, technology and the size 
of bank branches. Fourth, the effect of the intervention variables outweighs the effect 
of the inflation rate on loan recovery rates. The effectiveness of high real interest rates 
on the rural loan recovery rate appears to be undermined by the interventions associated 
with the political objective of getting re-elected. Privatizing the banks or giving public 
sector banks greater flexibility in setting interest rates, selecting borrowers and recovering 
delinquent loans could reduce the possibility of government interventions in rural financial 
markets. Variable interest rates, although introduced in Bangladesh in 1990, are not 
applicable in target rural lending. Furthermore, increasing interest rates may not be 
an effective method to stimulate loan recovery if governments distort rural financial 
markets with political interventions. 
Low loan recovery can be explained from different perspectives - economic, institutional 
and political economy. There is no denying that poor recovery rates in some cases are 
due to financial problems faced by borrowers. But, in addition, borrowers often do not 
repay loans and lenders can not energetically recover loans because of government 
interventions designed to increase the probability of winning elections. A failure to ad-
dress this dimension in loan recovery analysis may lead to incorrect policies prescrip-
tions. There is a growing evidence that for a given bank the recovery rate for govern-
ment sponsored loans is lower than for loans made out of a bank's own resources 
(Aguilera). Improving the viability of rural banks in a developing country like Bangladesh 
requires the reduction or elimination of government intervention in loan allocation and 
recovery so that banks are free to make good loans and recover them. In addition, the 
reduction in these interventions will probably increase the effectiveness of financial 
policies, particularly interest rates, in improving rural loan allocation and recovery. 
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Figure 1 Relationship between the Political Objective of Re-election and Intervention in Rural Financial Markets. 
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Abstract 
The rural loan recovery problem in developing countries is frequently analyzed from 
the perspective of borrowers or financial institutions. But a frequently overlooked pro-
blem is that borrowers often are discouraged to repay and/or institutions are not ag-
gressive in loan recovery because governments intervene in rural financial markets to 
increase the prospects of getting re-elected. This political intervention may undermine 
the effectiveness of measures such as increasing real interest rates to improve loan 
allocation and recovery. A failure to address this political dimension in loan recovery 
analysis may lead to incorrect policy prescriptions. This paper provides an empirical 
analysis of how political interventions affect rural loan recovery in Bangladesh in the 
period 1980 to 1989. The results indicate that the negative effect of political interven-
tion in loan allocation and recovery outweighs the effect of positive real interest rates. 
The government in Bangladesh intervenes in rural loan allocation and recovery formal-
ly through policies - interest exemptions, credit committees and interest rates - and 
informally through elected local government officials and local socio-political leaders. 
The intensity of informal intervention is expected to increase during an election period. 
Five variables - inflation rate, election years, interest exemption years, credit commit-
tee years and bank type - were included in the model used to explain loan recovery. 
The empirical results showed that elections, inflation rates, credit committees, and bank 
type affect rural loan recovery negatively, while interest exemptions affect it positively. 
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